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The paper is analysing self-determination, along with sovereignty, as main characteristics oj
the current international order. Self-determination, as a political concept, played a historical
role in the clash oJthe big multinational states in Europe, but the idea itself is ambiguous, thus
it was Jrequently misused and differently interpreted. The most recent aspects oj the meaning
oj self-determination include the inability oj the traditional definitions to account Jor new
challenges and needs oj national and other groups such as environmental issues. Further
problems arise when the concept oj self-determination is taken Jrom its political origins and
placed within the international-law Jramework where its potential ambiguities and different
interpretations can cause considerable problems. The self-determination principle should be
reJormulated in light oj its practical application, relative to newly emerging international
conflict management mechanism, where the principle itself should be encompassed within a
more comprehensive human rights philosophy.
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1. Introduction
Self-determination is one of the two core prin-
ciples of the existing international order. The first of
these principles is sovereignty; self-determination is
not as venerable as sovereignty, that emerged as a
principle and a basic concept of international law
within the state-system in Europe, but it is linked
with a more progressive stage of development of the
world community. It is associated with the rise of
democracy and the national idea.
Yet, from the times of Wilson, who was the
first to formulate this basic concept, it has been bur-
dened with ambiguities and vagueness. It was Wil-
son's Secretary of State Lansing who anticipated the
consequences of such ambiguities at the Paris Peace
Conference of 1919: "The phrase is simply loaded
with dynamite. It will raise hopes that can never be
realised. It will, I fear, cost thousands oflives ... what
a calamity that the phrase was ever uttered, what
misery it will cause ..." (Hutchings, 1997).
• Senior Research Fellow, Institute for International Relations,
Zagreb.
Yet, in that context, the idea of self-determi-
nation contributed to the collapse of the Habsburg
and the Ottoman Empires and it marked a step for-
ward, despite the contradictions in the application
of this principle: e.g., Czechoslovakia and Yugosla-
via, that emerged from the Versailles Treaty, are now
largely viewed by nationalists as "prisons of peo-
ples" after the break-up of the federalist states - ex-
actly as the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires
were perceived in their time. Even at that time, how-
ever, neither president Wilson nor the other allied
leaders believed that this guiding principle of the first
post-war period was absolute or universal. The
syntagm "self-determination" is conspicuous by its
absence in Wilson's celebrated "Fourteen points"
speech to the U.S. Congress in January 1918; The
phrase appeared a month later: "National aspirations
must be respected; peoples may be now dominated
and governed only by their own consent. 'Self-de-
termination' is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative
principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth
ignore at their peril". Yet the ambiguity of self-de-
termination, as well as the ambiguity of the concept
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of sovereignty, often turned into its opposite: wars
were fought in the name of self-determination, with
enormous human losses, and communities were de-
stroyed because of differences in the interpretation
of this principle (Howard, 1993).
The international community was taken aback
by this latest development in the evolution of the
concept of "self-determination": it failed to react con-
sistently and did not succeed in providing guidance
to those seeking to implement the principle in life,
thus reacting ambivalently. In the case of the post-
Communist collapse of the so-called "Communist
federations" (Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia), different criteria were applied to simi-
lar situations. E.g., the international community rec-
ognised the right of self-determination to Slovenians,
Croats and Muslims, but at the same time it was
ambiguous on the question of the Chechen self-de-
termination, or on the possibility of self-determina-
tion in Bosnia - for the other two ethnic groups there,
besides the dominant Muslims, or "Bosniaks".
2. Self-Determination between
Law and Politics
Another contradiction arises from the literal
application of the right to self-determination by in-
digenous populations and other communities in many
parts of the world. In these cases, self-determination
involves a complex chain of historical and other is-
sues that go far beyond the establishment of a new
state on the basis of a pre-existing territorial entity,
as was also stated by the Commission on Global
Governance, which stressed the necessity to reinter-
pret the problem of self-determinism in a new key.
New challenges arise also from the necessity to ex-
pand the principle to questions such as the degrada-
tion of the environment and global neighbourhood,
not only to the question of separate nationhood for
individual claimants.
The resurgence of nationalism on a global
scale has made the situation even more complicated.
In 1994, UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali
warned about the perils of "radical self-determina-
tion": "The U.N. has not closed its door. Yet if every
ethnic, religious or linguistic group claimed state-
hood, there would be no limit to fragmentation, and
peace and security and economic well being for all
would become ever more difficult to achieve. The
sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of
states within the established international system, and
the principle of self-determination for peoples, both
of great value and importance, must not be permit-
ted to work against each other in the period ahead"
(Bretherton, 1996).
Boutros-Ghali was right in assessing the pos-
sible development of the situation and its implica-
tions for the international organisation now number-
ing 185 member states, the recognition of the right
of self-determination solely on the basis of ethnic
identity would lead to general fragmentation and raise
this number - 185 member states - to almost 2000
states. In many cases today, the viability of many of
these states is highly questionable. First, their eco-
nomic self-sufficiency is under question, and, sec-
ond - the governability of the society is emerging as
another serious problem: many cases of political in-
stability caused by populist and nationalist govern-
ments, producing insecurity and threats to the gen-
eral stability of the international system, speak evi-
dently about the problem. No need to mention the
erosion of the state in many post-Communist coun-
tries, such as those that emerged after the collapse
of the Soviet Union, in which state authority matches
a Mafia-like structure, or complete chaos on the other
side, and the question of governability of such soci-
eties is the first concern.
Self-determination today provides a power-
ful political motive in modem Africa, where tribal
affinities make a pre-political background to its
emergence, and in post-Communist Europe as well,
where this "pre-political background" is provided
by a sense of national identity. Thus a problem is
posed also by the "self' which is to "determine",
and also in the ways how this self is determined: by
violence or by peaceful dialogue. The break-up of
Czechoslovakia raised no doubts because it was
arranged by peaceful negotiations, albeit opposed
by the representatives of the Czech people as un-
necessary, since no aspirations of domination to-
ward the Slovak nation were manifest. Yet in this
case nationalism prevailed - the general feeling by
the Slovaks of being threatened by a larger ethnic
group, the Czechs, which led to the establishment
of an authoritarian state led by Mecziar's national-
ists, although in this case the preservation of a fed-
eration with a higher degree of democracy could
have been expected. The same cannot be said of
Yugoslavia, considering the drive of the undemo-
cratic lust for power of Slobodan Milosevic: but in
this case, too, peaceful transition could have pre-
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vailed, or had the alternative offered by Prime Min-
ister Markovic- the last Yugoslav reformist - been
a viable one, significant losses in human lives might
have been avoided.
Therefore, the concept of "self-determination"
as an international legal concept, extracted from the
nature of political relations in one society, might be
easily a misguiding principle in international rela-
tions, as it proved to be in the present nationalistic
wave, fomented in great part by the opposition to
the Communist regimes in Europe that brought about
its collapse. It can be easily concluded that in its fer-
vour to bring down Communism, the international
community, led by Western democracies, forgot to
pay attention to the quality of the alternative: not all
the opposition to Communism was "democratic" by
nature. Nationalism was one of the major opponents
to Communism, but clearly it did not generate only
democratic values and political practices but a con-
tradictory conception of different trends and tenden-
cies and political values - the authoritarian alterna-
tive of populist and nationalist regimes. In such con-
text, Adam Michnik's witty conclusion that nation-
alism is "the last phase of Communism" seems very
apt.
3. Evolution of the Doctrine of
Self-Determination
Self-determination, thus, appeared to be a prin-
ciple, or rather, a political concept, used in many dif-
ferent cases and applied to different situations, loosing
its initial significance: this can be shown in three ex-
emplary cases. These cases can be also called three
distinct phases in the evolution of the "doctrine" of
self-determination. In the first phase, as Wilson con-
ceived it, it was a quintessentially American concept,
that the United states had invoked regularly, and that
embodied the "torch of liberty" brought by the United
States to the suffering nations of Europe who emerged
from World War 1. In this phase, self-determination
had a distinct moral drive - it was linked with the ad-
vancement of democracy and liberation of the "en-
slaved nations" of Central and East Europe.
In the second phase, as this doctrine became
universal through the mechanism of the universal
international organisation - the United Nations - it
was applied exclusively to cases of decolonization,
i.e. the pursuit of independence by European colo-
nies, mostly in Africa and Asia.
In this phase the scope and application of the
political concept was extended to become a right of
"all peoples", not only those who were liberated from
the oppression of multi-national empires, as stated
in the 1960 Colonial Declaration, the 1970 Declara-
tion of Principles ofInternational Law and the 1966
International Covenants on Human Rights. Applied
strictly, this principle would mean that all peoples
would become to some extent subjects of interna-
tiona 1 law, as the direct repositories of internation-
ally endorsed human rights, and, as M. Shaw argues,
if the definition of "people" used was the normal
political-sociological one, a major rearrangement of
perceptions about international relations would have
been created. In reality this has not occurred, and an
international relations concept of what constitutes a
people in this sense has been evolved, so that the
"self' in question had to be determined within the
accepted colonial territorial framework. Attempts to
broaden this have not been successful and the United
Nations has always strenuously opposed any attempt
at the partial or total disruption of the national unity
and territorial integrity of a country. A similar clas-
sic unresolved dilemma facing international organi-
sations is illustrated by the principles of the Helsinki
Final Act of 1975: principle 8 of the Final Act re-
quires participating states to respect the equal rights
of "peoples", including the right to self-determina-
tion in relation to their internal and external politi-
cal status. Principle 6, however, reaffirms the tradi-
tional proposition that participating states must re-
frain from intervention "direct or indirect, individual
or collective", in matters falling within the domestic
jurisdiction of another participating state. Here we
have the fact that internationally recognised norms
asserting the human rights of individuals and the
collective rights of peoples stand in contradiction to
the sovereign immunity of states from external in-
tervention on matters falling within their "domestic
jurisdiction" (Tomuschat, 1993).
During the Cold War - and here we come to
phase three - the United States started to use this
term with reference, mostly, to the Baltic States and
other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, but
with a different meaning. As R. Hutchings states,
when successive U.S. administrations said "self-de-
termination", they really meant "independence" or
"liberation" from Soviet domination of countries in
Central and Eastern Europe whose existence was
already recognised. Terms like "captive nations" and
"rollback" sounded too provocative and retrograde,
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so the U.S. invoked the more high-sounding princi-
ple of self-determination - imbuing it with a status
which they would shortly have reason to regret
(Hutchings, 1993). For understandable tactical rea-
sons, the United States allowed itself to be identi-
fied as the champion of a principle of dubious legal-
ity or practicability. The question that arose in the
previous phase - the question of what a people is, re-
emerged in full majesty.
What is a people? Is it a nation, a state, a con-
stituent republic - as in the Yugoslav case - or a fed-
eral state, or a community of people, however con-
stituted? In a multinational federal state, who has
the right to self determination - the totality of the
federation, the federal units, or the nationalities dis-
persed among those units, as K. Shehadi put it? These
were concrete dilemmas, to which previous experi-
ence and the history of international relations did
not give an answer: in the process of decolonization
these details were overlooked - with the tragic con-
sequence of inter-ethnic wars that burst out, not dur-
ing the period of decolonisation but rather after the
end of the Cold War and the global confrontation -
i.e., in the nineties (Shehadi., 1993).
4. Self-Determination and the
Disintegration of Yugoslavia
During the disintegration of Yugoslavia - at
its very beginning - it became clear that the princi-
ple of "self-determination" was contradictory, and
that the term seemed to refer to a process rather than
to an outcome: the principle was invoked as a vehi-
cle by which statehood was to be achieved. This con-
tradiction in terms was manifested in the inherent
contradiction between the invoked principle of self-
determination and the principle of the sanctity of
existing borders. Yet both the United Nations and
CSCE documents - the Helsinki Final Act - only
opposed the violent change of existing borders, but
also allowed for the possibility of borders changes
so long as they were accomplished peacefully and
consensually. This seemed to imply that the
concept of self-determination conflicted with the
term of sovereignty - or at least sovereignty as it was
found, i.e. the existing territorial arrangement. Ten-
sions between sovereignty and self-determination -
both obsolete political concepts - mounted and could
not be resolved to mutual satisfaction. The questions
raised were: what ifborder changes are neither peace-
ful nor consensual? What if independence declara-
tions are contested?
Since the beginning of the Yugoslav crises the
international community has been trying to resolve
this dilemma, but with no great success. If we only
look at the Political Declaration of the G-7 Summit
in London in July 1991, we shall see a weak attempt
to harmonise the two principles: The G-7 countries
expressed their wish to encourage and support the
process of dialogue and negotiation in accordance
with the principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final
Act and the Paris Charter for a New Europe. In do-
ing so, these countries stressed the "particular re-
spect for human rights, including rights of minori-
ties and the right of people to self-determination in
conformity with the Charter of the UN" - and with
the "relevant norms of international law - including
those relating to the territorial integrity of states."
(Kirgis, 1994).
Self-determination seemed to clash with the
principle of territorial integrity of states. Yet, natu-
rally, as events evolved, the principle of territorial
integrity was subordinated to the principle of self-
determination. The process of achieving self-deter-
mination in the case of former Yugoslavia was not a
"pure process" - it was intertwined with a bloody
war that burst out in the form of an open aggression
and defence against aggression, which in many cases
assumed the form of an excessive self-defence. In
such a mess, made possible also by ambiguous in-
terpretations of the principle of self-determination
and sovereignty, and especially of their mutual rela-
tionship, as the U.S.A. and the European Commu-
nity did, the result was that the "self' entitled to claim
the right of self-determination was limited to territo-
rial entities, and no other "self' was recognised as a
potentially legitimate claimant. When Croatia de-
clared its independence, this was done by and on
behalf of Croats within that republic, yet this terri-
tory was under the jurisdiction of the Republic of
Croatia as a whole, and the vehicle for seeking rec-
ognition was the government of that republic. Thus
in Croatia, Bosnia, Ukraine and elsewhere - as R.
Hutchings puts it, the international community was
obliged to deal with claimants who spoke for only
part of the "peoples" within their borders (Hutchings,
1993).
For these reasons, the international community
had to set down an interpretation of the situation in
which self-determination is applied, in which the re-
sult of the "process" of self-determination is to be rec-
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ognised internationally. In December 1991 the Euro-
pean Community issued these guidelines, which were
amplified in the work of the Badinter Commission.
These guidelines set up five main points that
would guide the policy of the European Community
toward recognition of new states emerging from Yu-
goslavia as the result of the process of self-determi-
nation: the first point was the respect for the provi-
sions of the Charter of the United Nations and the
commitments subscribed to in the Helsinki Final Act
and in the Charter of Paris, especially with regard to
the rule oflaw, democracy and human rights; the sec-
ond point speaks of guarantees for the rights of ethnic
and national groups and minorities in accordance with
the CSCE; the third point requests respect for the in-
violability of all frontiers, which can be only changed
by peaceful means and by common agreement; the
fourth point relates to the acceptance of all relevant
commitments with regard to disarmament and nuclear
non-proliferation as well as to security and regional
stability; the fifth point deals with the commitment to
settle by agreement, including, where appropriate, by
recourse to arbitration, all questions concerning state
succession and regional disputes.
As it can be seen, these stipulations presented
a further conceptual difficulty, one which arose both
in Yugoslavia and in the Soviet Union: namely, that
the "self' invoking self-determination was not al-
ways the same "self' that sought recognition - ex-
actly for the reasons explained above.
The implications of this process are truly dis-
turbing: self-determination was granted to peoples,
who already had their territorial extension: Slovenia
was granted the right of self-determination and rec-
ognition, and it is the only "pure" example in which
it was possible to apply the principle of self-deter-
mination without ambiguities. In all other cases, be-
cause of the ethnic configuration - "leopard spots",
or ethnic enclaves disseminated throughout the coun-
try - this principle was obfuscated by compromises,
as in the case of Bosnia.
Thirdly, the right to self-determination was not
even considered, as in the case of the Albanians in
Kosovo. Dogmatists and purists could easily argue
that the application of the principle should extend also
to the minorities within states - i.e. Croats in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Serbs in Croatia, Serbs in Bosnia,
Albanians in Kosovo, etc. Yet this is not the problem.
The problem lies in the very substance of the concept
of self-determination, its relativity and limitations. The
radical application of this principle would have caused
even more troubles, than were caused by its half-ap-
plication. Therefore, the logical conclusion is that this
political concept is itselfburdened with contradictions,
and therefore carmot be the only and exclusive crite-
rion for the behaviour of states and the international
community in international relations. The indiscrimi-
nate invocation of the rights of self-determination
immediately poses the question of the other "self' -
minority groups and other parts of the same "self'
under the sovereignty of other nations. This is evi-
dent in the case ofKosovo - the Albanian minority in
Yugoslavia and in the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, in the case of the Hungarian minorities in
Romania and Slovakia, in the case of the Russian mi-
nority in the Baltic states. It can be applied to almost
all East-European countries. Here the sacred princi-
ple of self-determination cannot be the dominant cri-
terion for the recognition of statehood. Instead, other
concerns and principles should be developed, and these
principles should imply and reflect at the same time
the interdependence of the modem world and the proc-
ess of the transformation of the nation-state. Yet this
is very difficult to achieve in situations in which na-
tionalisms use the vehicle of self-determination for
their own ends, and almost without exception every
process of self-determination tends to end up in a
"greater-state" project: a Greater Croatia, a Greater
Serbia, a Greater Albania ... etc.
Self-determination has achieved legitimisation
as one of the basic human rights, albeit as a collec-
tive right. But in many cases, this specific human
right collides and clashes with the human rights of
the individual. The international community and
policy-makers in individual states that form the in-
ternational community have the task to avoid colli-
sion between the human rights of self-determination
and other inalienable human rights. This is not an
easy task, and is long overdue.
5. Contradictions in the Term:
From External to Internal Self-
Determ ination
Where do we stand now, after the shocking
bloodshed and the discouraging experience of the
"Yugoslav wars", as well as of other ethnic conflicts,
especially in the Caucasus and in the territories of
the former Soviet Union?
Many nationalities which embraced the cause
of self-determination achieved it by obtaining the
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internationally recognised right to statehood. How-
ever, in many cases - and Slovakia and Croatia are
not isolated examples - the new states did not add
very much to the panopticum of newly emerged de-
mocracies: instead of becoming democratic, these
states became authoritarian, and the specter of se-
cession and proliferating self-determination triggered
a whole series of international as well as internal
conflicts, which continue to multiply. The challenge
to international security is not global - the global
threat posed by the Soviet Empire has been replaced
by a whole network of micro-threats, causing a lot
of trouble, since the existing mechanisms of inter-
national security are not adapted to deal with micro-
threats, and producing a whole series of internal in-
stabilities that may grow and take the form of un-
manageable conflict spreading throughout whole
regions. Conflicts within states, often triggered by
ethnic or cultural differences, will continue to pro-
liferate. Ethnic conflicts and micro-conflicts, caused
by the ingovernability of such societies emerging
after the collapse of Communism, in which nation-
alists and authoritarian populists prevailed, pose sub-
stantial threats to international peace and human life.
Coherent responses to such conflicts have not yet
been found, and another global alliance - NATO -
has been humiliated by being forced to deal with such
conflicts, not worthy of such mighty assembled nu-
clear striking force based on strategic offensive doc-
trines, where the quest is for a powerful enemy and
not the micro-protagonists of ethnic conflicts. The
international community has not yet adapted and has
not yet created mechanisms to deal with such crises
provoked by ethnic conflicts and fragmented war
dangers, such as in Kosovo, Bosnia, the Caucasus,
and the Middle East (Fox, 1995).
Military force can strike even aggressors in
small ethnic conflicts, and military force can estab-
lish control over a particular territory, but it cannot
create international legitimacy. A NATO strike
against Yugoslavia because of the fight of the
Kosovo's Albanians for self-determination - in the
ultimate form of secession and then, by spilling over
the boundaries, of re-uniting with Albanians in Al-
bania and Albanians in Macedonia to create a
"Greater Albania" - can subdue the use of violence
by Milosevic's regime, but cannot give full legiti-
mati on to the aspirations of the Kosovo Albanians
to create an independent state. The use of the doc-
trine of national self-determination by ethnic sepa-
ratists to justify their demands for secession is espe-
cially damaging as far as the integrity and security
of Third World countries are concerned, argues
Mohammed Ayoob. This is because it directly
counters the imperatives of state-making and effec-
tive statehood in multi ethnic polities. And another
reason that supports this thesis is the fact that, since
boundaries of almost all Third World states encom-
pass more than one ethnic group, the legitimation of
ethno-national self-determination in any part of the
globe can have demonstrative effects that could be
catastrophic for several Third World states. The same
applies to the example quoted above, i.e. Kosovo.
Lloyd Cutler states that this assertion is validated by
the fact that, under the banner of self-determination
there are active movements in more than sixty coun-
tries - one third of the total roster of nations - to
achieve full sovereignty or some lesser degree of
"minority" rights; and, moreover, a number of these
movements have developed into ongoing civil wars
(Ayoob, 1995).
As Hannum argues, if the international com-
munity feels compelled to become involved in the
extraordinarily difficult process through which peo-
ple accept or reject national identity and fight for it,
it must agree on criteria for intervention that go be-
yond a simple political preference for one side or
another. We are faced, here, with the task of defin-
ing the appropriate degree of foreign interest in the
face of an almost infinite variety of demands for self-
determination (Hannun, 1993).
Therefore, the solution should not be sought
only in the superficial intervention by force on ex-
ternal manifestations of self-determination. The full
extent of the political concept of self-determination
should be identified, and that is not only "external"
self-determination, but also "internal" self-determi-
nation. The latter, sometimes referred to by Woodrow
Wilson and others, implies finding appropriate lev-
els of democratic self-government to guarantee ef-
fective participation by all in the economic and po-
liticallife of the country. Therefore, the international
community cannot avoid any more the question of
the very essence of self-determination, it being a
problem with two faces: its external face leads to
the establishment of national sovereignty, of the col-
lective sovereignty of one nation over its territory.
But the other face implies that self-determination
does not stop with the nation, or with the dominant
ethnic group, or whatever collective entity is con-
cerned: radically conceived (and applied) self-deter-
mination means also the quality of government, i.e.
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the right to self-determination of the individual within
the political boundaries, which means, in fact, that
self-determination brought to its radical consequence
is nothing else but the application of inalienable hu-
man rights to the political life of every single coun-
try, irrespective of the degree of "external" self-de-
termination achieved (Hannum, 1998).
Therefore, when responding to claims of self-
determination, the protection of basic human rights
should be the policymakers' foremost goal; thus, a
basic consideration in formulating responses to self-
determination claims should be whether or not a par-
ticular action is likely to promote the rights of all the
people concerned. In such "new thinking" human
rights become the main concern, and the policy of
human rights in an interdependent world becomes
the ultimate criterion for international politics and
international action.
There is nothing more dangerous than a prin-
ciple that is only half-applied. As an external right,
self-determination is, like sovereignty, an ambigu-
ous political concept that permits secession, the
achievement of statehood, and the creation of a new
state entity. But it leaves the question of internal self-
determination intact: is this new state, which is the
embodiment of the principle of self-determination,
a democratic or an authoritarian state? What is the
relationship between the collective right of, let me
say, secession under the aegis of self-determination,
and the right of ethnic or cultural minorities within
this entity? What are the political rights of the peo-
ple, their freedom of expression, freedom of politi-
cal assembly, right to chose and to be chosen in a
democratic, undiscriminatory election? What is the
substance of social and economic rights to which the
citizens are entitled to? Are people citizens in this
new polity, or are they only subjects? If all these prob-
lems are taken into consideration, and if our concern
is with peoples rather than territories or collectives,
there is no reason to regard self-determination, and
especially its "external" form, as a sacrosanct prin-
ciple that should be applied in all cases. On the con-
trary, if we care about the advancement of democ-
racy, then "internal" self-determination must be our
ultimate goal, and the ultimate goal of the interna-
tional community. Self-determination should not be
used as a tool suitable for "real-politik", for main-
taining the balance of power and fear - it should be
applied thoroughly, including interference by the
international community in purely "internal" affairs,
if the situation is such that human rights standard
are violated, irrespective of the motive and explana-
tion or justification for such violations.
Emboldened by the international community's
acceptance of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, dissat-
isfied groups in all parts of the world have decided
that wars ofliberation are more likely to obtain mean-
ingful outside support than lower-keyed appeals for
minority rights or autonomy, as Hannum reflects on
the dilemmas caused by the "spectre of secession".
He demands a more clearly formulated set of inter-
national norms that may discourage at least some
questionable claims and the ready resort to violence
that often accompanies them. The implication of such
thinking is that the ultimate goal of such policy is
the consistent fight for the achievement of basic hu-
man rights. And, therefore, whether self-determina-
tion as a process will conclude with the creation of a
new state is not the main point. The main point is
whether "internal" self-determination is achieved, or
applied to its last consequence (Hannum, 1998).
But, in order to come to this stage, the inter-
national community needs to undergo a process in
which interdependence and globalisation will deter-
mine the fate of the whole planet, and local conflicts
- ethnic, political, civil wars, internal battles for the
democratisation of the society - will not be dismissed
by the international community as purely internal
questions; instead, these questions should become
the concern of the whole community. In this respect,
a new thinking is needed, as well as new mechanisms
of intervention and regulation of such processes, in
order not to let them run out of control.
The violence we see around us is not gener-
ated by the drive for full self-determination, but by
its negation, or rather by the use and manipulation
of self-determination only to achieve statehood and
to affirm sovereignty of one ethnic group. The de-
nial offull self-determination, not its pursuit, is what
leads to upheavals and conflicts. This has not been
made quite distinct even by Stavenhagen, who rightly
advocates the pursuit of self-determination, but omits
to identify the kind of self-determination we have to
consider. (Stavenhagen, 1992). He is right in assess-
ing that the denial of self-determination is essentially
incompatible with true democracy. Only if the peo-
pies' right to self-determination is fully respected
can a democratic society flourish, and only within a
truly democratic framework, in which all other hu-
man rights are given due recognition, will the right
to self-determination be freed from the "demons",
real or putative, which now plague it. The challenge
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is how to transform these basic principles into effec-
tive political and legal institutions, especially in the
face of the situation, that the right of self-de term ina-
tion of one group, however well defined, may con-
flict with an equally valid right of another group.
The presence in the international community of so
many authoritarian, not to say despotic, states, in
which the rights of ethnic and other minorities have
been constantly violated, even in the situation when
that majority achieved self-determination in a diffi-
cult set of circumstances - see the example of Croatia
- has, however, prevented full acceptance of the prin-
ciple as a criterion for the democratic legitimation
of governments. Trends are slowly emerging that
might lead to such acceptance, particularly the stead-
ily increasing spread of norms and institutions relat-
ing to human rights. On the other hand, there is little
chance of the legal acceptance of this principle as
implying a right of independence for ethnic groups
or religious minorities: the multiethnic composition
of many states, or the presence in them of large mi-
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